Roger Williams University Law Review
Volume 26
Issue 3 Vol. 26: No. 3 (Summer 2021)

Article 13

Summer 2021

State v. Gumkowski, 223 A.3d 321 (R.I. 2020)
Lindsay E. Koso
Candidate for Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR
Part of the Criminal Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Koso, Lindsay E. (2021) "State v. Gumkowski, 223 A.3d 321 (R.I. 2020)," Roger Williams University Law
Review: Vol. 26 : Iss. 3 , Article 13.
Available at: https://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR/vol26/iss3/13

This Survey of Rhode Island Law is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DOCS@RWU. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Roger Williams University Law Review by an authorized editor of DOCS@RWU.
For more information, please contact mwu@rwu.edu.

Criminal Law. State v. Gumkowski, 223 A.3d 321 (R.I. 2020). The
overwhelming weight of circumstantial evidence that a defendant
committed a murder, combined with some physical evidence, is
enough for a jury to convict a defendant of said murder. This
evidence should be considered in full when assessing the defendant’s motion for a new trial.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

On May 11, 2011, defendant Matthew Gumkowski
(Gumkowski) allegedly slashed the throat and burned the home of
Michael DiRaimo (DiRaimo).1 Based on circumstantial evidence,
including telephone records, cell-tower pings, text messages
between the defendant and the decedent, and finding DiRaimo’s
cellphone in Gumkowski’s possession after the murder, the State
charged Gumkowski with first-degree murder and first-degree
arson.2 Gumkowski was tried in Providence County Superior
Court, and the jury found Gumkowski guilty on both counts.3
Gumkowski immediately filed a motion with the Superior
Court for a new trial pursuant to Rule 33 of the Superior Court
Rules of Criminal Procedure.4 The trial justice heard the motion
on July 12, 2016, and denied the motion in an oral decision on the
same day.5 The Superior Court sentenced Gumkowski to life
imprisonment for first-degree murder followed by forty-five years
for first-degree arson.6
Gumkowski appealed to the Supreme Court, challenging the
trial justice’s denial of his motion for a new trial.7 In his petition,
Gumkowski argued that the trial justice was wrong in her denial of
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his motion for a new trial because the verdict was against the
weight of the evidence.8 In particular, Gumkowski argued that the
evidence did not support the conclusion that he was the perpetrator
and did not support a finding of premeditation beyond a reasonable
doubt.9
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the
judgment.10
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

Upon review of the appeal, the Court turned to the standards
of review for Rule 33 motions, which are found in State v.
Johnson.11 In relevant part, the Court in Johnson held that a trial
justice, when presented with a Rule 33 motion, “acts as a thirteenth
juror and exercises independent judgment on the credibility of
witnesses and on the weight of the evidence.”12 The judge thereby
conducts an independent assessment of the entirety of the evidence
to determine whether she would have reached a different
conclusion than the jury.13 In the case of Gumkowski, the Court
determined that the trial justice had correctly applied and analyzed
Gumkowski’s motion by the Johnson standard.14 The Court
therefore upheld the trial court’s denial of the motion.15
The Court then turned to Gumkowski’s argument that the
weight of the evidence did not support finding that he was the
perpetrator of the murder and arson. Gumkowski argued that no
reasonable jury could find that the text messages proved that he
had motive to kill DiRaimo, and that a reasonable jury could only
conclude that his possession of DiRaimo’s cellphone was at best
proof of theft.16 Furthermore, Gumkowski maintained that the
excerpts of text messages between Gumkowski and DiRaimo
presented by the State were misleading because they caused the
jury to overlook the entirety of DiRaimo’s text-messaging history.17
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id.
Id. at 329.
Id. at 332.
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The Court disagreed with Gumkowski on all three fronts and
instead agreed with the trial justice who held that the weight of the
evidence was sufficient.18 The Court agreed with the trial judge
that from the text messages “the jury reasonably inferred as does
the [c]ourt the [d]efendant went to DiRaimo’s house, killed him, set
the house on fire to cover up the murder, took the phone and went
home, and it was indeed the [d]efendant who took the phone.”19
Ultimately, after reviewing the complete collection of text messages
and phone records between Gumkowski and DiRaimo, the Court
concurred that the pings on DiRaimo’s cellphone matched the
State’s timeline for the murder and arson and that the
circumstantial evidence was overwhelmingly in support of placing
an increasingly angry Gumkowski at DiRaimo’s residence at the
time of the murder and fire.20 Finally, the Court agreed with the
trial justice that neither the judge nor the jury were misled by the
State’s emphasis on the communications between Gumkowski and
DiRaimo.21
Finally, Gumkowski argued that the verdict was against the
weight of the evidence because the evidence presented at trial could
not support a finding of premeditation.22 His reasoning was
threefold: first, there was no evidence of planning; second, no reasonable juror could have found premeditation in the text messages;
and third, the defensive wounds found on DiRaimo’s hands
disproved the classification of first-degree murder.23 The Court
agreed with the trial judge that the violence of the crime combined
with the wounds to the decedent’s hands made it likely that these
were defensive wounds and indicative of a premeditated murder.24
The Court agreed noted, as had the trial judge, that evidence
of a plan is not required to prove premeditation, so his first
argument did not hold water.25 Furthermore, as the trial judge had
remarked, “[t]he evidence was overwhelming that someone
committed first degree murder in the killing of Michael DiRaimo.
18.
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Id. at 329–30.
Id. at 330 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 331.
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Id. at 331–32.
Id. at 332.
Id. (citing State v. Gillespie, 960 A.2d 969, 977 (R.I. 2008)).
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His throat was slashed almost from ear to ear. It was particularly
malicious.”26 Accordingly, the Court upheld the trial justice’s
rulings, concluded that the jury’s findings were reasonable, and
determined that the weight of the evidence fully supported the
conviction.27
COMMENTARY

Murder in the first degree is one of the most heinous crimes
addressed by our court system, and the burden of proof is
accordingly heavy. In order to find a defendant guilty, the jury
must find that the state proved the defendant’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. This is why conviction upon circumstantial
evidence deserves the utmost scrutiny. In her review of Gumkowski’s motion for a new trial, the trial justice remarked, “[t]he
evidence was overwhelming that someone committed first degree
murder in the killing of Michael DiRaimo. . . . It was particularly
malicious.”28 It could be argued that the evidence, being entirely
circumstantial, did not meet the “beyond a reasonable doubt”
standard.
Likewise the distinction between murder in the first and
second degrees sits on a hair’s edge: “[f]irst-degree murder requires
that the defendant harbored a more-than-momentary intent to kill
prior to committing the homicide.”29 Accordingly, “[t]he premeditation necessary to establish first-degree murder must have existed
for some appreciable length of time before the killing; it must have
existed for more than just a moment.”30 These incredibly fine
distinctions, distinctions that can change the course of a person’s
life, are almost too ephemeral to be ascertained with only
circumstantial evidence. The violence of the crime has been
established, but it could be argued that the defendant’s mens rea
has not been sufficiently established. However, in this case, both
the trial justice and the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the
evidence was strong enough to implicate the defendant and prove
him guilty of murder in the first degree.

26.
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Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Gillespie, 960 A.2d at 977.
State v. Amazeen, 526 A.2d 1268, 1271 (R.I. 1987).
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CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that, where
overwhelming circumstantial evidence supports a finding that a
defendant was the perpetrator of a crime, a trial court does not err
in denying a defendant’s motion for a new trial under Rule 33 of the
Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. The
Court further held that evidence of defensive wounds on a
victim’s hands, combined with a violent and fatal attack, can
support a finding of premeditation.
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